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Abstract—Recent results have shown that lattice codes can be
used to construct good channel codes, source codes and physical
layer network codes for Gaussian channels. On the other hand,
for Gaussian channels with secrecy constraints, efforts to date
rely on random codes. In this work, we provide a tool to bridge
these two areas so that the secrecy rate can be computed when
lattice codes are used. In particular, we address the problem of
bounding equivocation rates under nonlinear modulus operation
that is present in lattice encoders/decoders. The technique is
then demonstrated in two Gaussian channel examples: (1) a
Gaussian wiretap channel with a cooperative jammer, and (2)
a multi-hop line network from a source to a destination with
untrusted intermediate relay nodes from whom the information
needs to be kept secret. In both cases, lattice codes are used to
facilitate cooperative jamming. In the second case, interestingly,
we demonstrate that a non-vanishing positive secrecy rate is
achievable regardless of the number of hops.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information theoretic secrecy was first proposed by Shan-
non in [1]. In this classical model, Bob wants to send a
message to Alice, which needs to be kept secret from Eve.
Shannon’s notion of secrecy requires the average rate of
information leaked to Eve to be zero, with no assumption
made on the computational power of Eve. Wyner, in [2],
pointed out that, more often than not, the eavesdropper
(Eve) has a noisy copy of the signal transmitted from the
source, and building a useful secure communication system
per Shannon’s notion is possible [2]. Csiszar and Korner [3]
extended this to a more general channel model.
Numerous channel models have since been studied under
Shannon’s framework. The maximum reliable transmission
rate with secrecy is identified for several cases including
the Gaussian wiretap channel [4] and the MIMO wiretap
channel [5], [6], [7]. Sum secrecy capacity for a degraded
Gaussian multiple access wiretap channel is given in [8].
For other channels, upper bounds, lower bounds and some
asymptotic results on the secrecy capacity exist. For the
achievability part, Shannon’s random coding argument proves
to be effective in majority of these works.
On the other hand, it is known that the random coding
argument may be insufficient to prove capacity theorems for
certain channels [9]. Instead, structured codes like lattice
codes are used. Using structured codes has two benefits. First,
it is relatively easy to analyze large networks under these
codes. For example, in [10], [11], the lattice code allows the
relaying scheme to be equivalent to a modulus sum operation,
making it easy to trace the signal over a multi-hop relay
network. Secondly, the structured nature of these codes makes
it possible to align unwanted interference, for example, for
the interference channel with more than two users [12], [13],
and the two way relay channel [10], [11].
A natural question is therefore whether structured codes
are useful for secure communication as well. In particular, in
this work, we are interested in answering two questions:
1) How do we bound the secrecy capacity when structured
codes are used?
2) Are there models where structured codes prove to be
useful in providing secrecy?
Relevant references in this line of thinking includes [14]
and [15]. Reference [14] considers a binary additive two-
way wiretap channel where one terminal uses binary jamming
signals. Reference [15] examines a wiretap channel where the
eavesdropping channel is a modulus-Λ channel. Under the
proposed signaling scheme therein, the source uses a lattice
code to convey the secret message, and, the destination jams
the eavesdropper with a lattice code. The eavesdropper sees
the sum of these two codes, both taking value in a finite
group, where the sum is carried under the addition defined
over the group. It is known that if the jamming signal is
sampled from a uniform distribution over the group, then the
sum is independent from the message.
While these are encouraging steps in showing the impact of
structured jamming signals, as commented in [15], using this
technique in Gaussian channels is a non-trivial step. In the
Gaussian channel, also, the eavesdropper receives the sum of
the signal from the source and the jamming signal. However,
the addition is over real numbers rather than over a finite
group. The property of modulus sum is therefore lost and it
is difficult to measure how much information is leaked to the
eavesdropper.
Most lattice codes for power constrained transmission have
a similar structure to the one used in [15]. First, a lattice is
constructed, which should be a good channel code under the
noise/interference. Then, to meet the power constraint, the
lattice, or its shifted version, is intersected with a bounded
set, called the shaping set, to create a set of lattice points
with finite average power. The lattice is shifted to make sure
sufficiently many lattice points fall into the shaping set to
maintain the codebook size and hence the coding rate [16].
The decoder at the destination is called a lattice decoder if it
is only asked to find the most likely lattice point under the
received signals, and is not aware of shaping set. Because of
the structured nature of the lattice, a lattice decoder has lower
complexity compared to the maximum likelihood decoder
where the knowledge of shaping set is used. Also, under
the lattice decoder, the introduction of shaping set does not
pose any additional difficulty to the analysis of decoding
performance. Commonly used shaping sets include the sphere
[12] and the fundamental region of a lattice [17].
A key observation is that, from the viewpoint of an eaves-
dropper, the shaping set actually provides useful information,
since it reduces the set of lattice points the eavesdropper
needs to consider. The main aim of this work, therefore, is
to find a shaping set and lattice code construction under
which the information leaked to the eavesdropper can be
bounded. This shaping set, as we shall see, turns out to be the
fundamental region of a “coarse” lattice in a nested lattice
structure. Under this construction, we show that at most 1 bit
is leaked to the eavesdropper per channel use. This enables
us to lower bound the secrecy rate using a technique similar
to the genie bound from [18].
To demonstrate the utility of our approach, we then apply
our technique to two channel models: a Gaussian wiretap
channel with a cooperative jammer, and a multi-hop line
network, where a source can communicate a destination only
through a chain of untrusted relays. In the second case,
we demonstrate that a non-vanishing positive secrecy rate
is achievable regardless of the number of hops.
The following notation is used throughout this work: We
use H to denote the entropy. εk is used to denote any
variable that goes to 0 when n goes to ∞. We define
C(x) = 12 log2(1 + x). ⌊a⌋ denotes the largest integer less
than or equal to a.
II. THE REPRESENTATION THEOREM
In this section, we present a result about lattice codes
which will be useful in the sequel.
Let Λ denote a lattice in RN [17], i.e., a set of points
which is a group closed under real vector addition. The
modulus operation x mod Λ is defined as x mod Λ = x −
argminy∈Λ d(x, y), where d(x, y) is the Euclidean distance
between x and y. The fundamental region of a lattice V is
defined as the set {x : x mod Λ = 0}. It is possible that there
are more than one lattice points that have the same minimal
distance to x. Breaking a tie like this is done by properly
assign the boundary of V [17].
Let tA and tB be two numbers taken from V . For any set
A, define 2A as 2A = {2x : x ∈ A}. Then we have:
{tA + tB : tA, tB ∈ V} = 2V (1)
Define Ax as Ax = {tA + tB + x, tA, tB ∈ V}. Then from
(1), we have Ax = x + 2V . With this preparation, we are
ready to prove the following representation theorem:
Theorem 1: There exists a random integer T , such that
1 ≤ T ≤ 2N , and tA+tB is uniquely determined by {T, tA+
tB mod Λ}.
Proof: By definition of the modulus Λ operation, we
have
tA + tB mod Λ = tA + tB + x, x ∈ Λ (2)
The theorem is equivalent to finding the number of possible
x meeting equation (2) for a given tA + tB mod Λ.
To do that, we need to know a little more about the struc-
ture of lattice Λ. Every point in a lattice, by definition, can be
represented in the following form [19]: x =
N∑
i=1
aivi, vi ∈
RN , ai ∈ Z . {ai} is said to be the coordinates of the lattice
point x under the basis {vi}.
Based on this representation, we can define the following
relationship: Consider two points x, y ∈ Λ, with coordinates
{ai} and {bi} respectively. Then we say x ∼ y if ai =
bi mod 2, i = 1...N . It is easy to see the relationship ∼ is
an equivalence relationship. Therefore, it defines a partition
over Λ.
1) Depending on the values of ai − bi mod 2, there are
2N sets in this partition.
2) The sub-lattice 2Λ is one set in the partition, whose
members have even coordinates. The remaining 2N−1
sets are its cosets.
Let Ci denote any one of these cosets or 2Λ. Then Ci can
expressed as Ci = 2Λ + yi, yi ∈ Λ. It is easy to verify that
Ax = x + 2V , x ∈ Ci is a partition of 2RN + yi, which
equals RN .
We proceed to use the two partitions derived above: Since
Ci, i = 1...2
N is a partition of Λ, (2) can be solved by
considering the following 2N equations:
tA + tB mod Λ = tA + tB + x, x ∈ Ci (3)
From (1), this means tA + tB mod Λ ∈ x + 2V for some
x ∈ Ci. Since x+ 2V , x ∈ Ci is a partition of RN , there is
at most one x ∈ Ci that meets this requirement. This implies
for a given tA + tB mod Λ, and a given coset Ci, (3) only
has one solution for x. Since there are 2N such equations,
(2) has at most 2N solutions. Hence each tA + tB mod Λ
corresponds to at most 2N points of tA + tB .
Remark 1: Theorem 1 implies that modulus operation
looses at most one bit per dimension of information if
tA, tB ∈ V .
The following crypto lemma is useful and is provided here
for completeness.
Lemma 1: [15] Let tA, tB be two independent random
variables distributed over the a compact abelian group, tB
has a uniform distribution, then tA+ tB is independent from
tA. Here + is the addition over the group.
In the remainder of the paper, (Λ,Λ1) denotes a nested
lattice structure where Λ1 is the coarse lattice. Let V and V1
be their respective fundamental regions. We shall use a⊕ b,
short for a+ b mod Λ1. Then from Lemma 1, we have the
following corollary:
Corollary 1: Let tA ∈ Λ ∩ V1. tB ∈ Λ ∩ V1 and tB is
uniformly distributed over Λ ∩ V1. Let tS = tA ⊕ tB . Then
tS is independent from tA.
III. WIRETAP CHANNEL WITH A COOPERATIVE JAMMER
In this section, we demonstrate the use of lattice codes
for secrecy in the simple model depicted in Figure 1. Nodes
S,D,E form a wiretap channel where S is the source node,
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Fig. 1. Wiretap Channel with a Cooperative Jammer, CJ
D is the destination node, E is the eavesdropper. Let the
average power constraint of node S be P . Now suppose
that there is another transmitter CJ in the system, also
with power constraint P , as shown in Figure 1. We assume
that the interference caused by CJ to node D is either too
weak or too strong that it can be ignored or removed, and
consequently there is no link between CJ and D. In this
model, node CJ may choose to help S by transmitting a
jamming signal to confuse the eavesdropper E. Below, we
derive the secrecy rate for this case when the jamming signal
is chosen from a lattice codebook.
A. Gaussian Noise
We first consider the case when Z1 and Z2 are independent
Gaussian random variables with zero mean and unit variance.
In this case, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 2: A secrecy rate of [C(P )− 1]+ is achievable.
Proof: The codebook is constructed as follows: Let
(Λ,Λ1) be a properly designed nested lattice structure in RN
as described in [17]. The codebook is all the lattice points
within the set Λ ∩ V1.
Let tNA be the lattice point transmitted by node S. Let
dNA be the dithering noise uniformly distributed over V1. The
transmitted signal is given by tNA ⊕dNA . The receiver receives
the above signal corrupted by Gaussian noise and tries to
decode tNA . Let the decoding result be tˆNA . Then as shown in
[17, Theorem 5], there exists a sequence of properly designed
(Λ,Λ1) with increasing dimension, such that
lim
N→∞
1
N
log2 |Λ ∩ V1| < C(P ) (4)
C(P ) =
1
2
log2(1 + P ) (5)
and limN→∞ Pr(tNA 6= tˆNA ) = 0.
The cooperative jammer CJ uses the same codebook as
node S. Let the lattice point transmitted by CJ be tNB and
the dithering noise be dNB . The transmitted signal is given
by tNB ⊕ dNB . As in [17], we assume that dNA is known by
node S, the legitimate receiver node D and the eavesdropper
node E. dNB is known by node S, and the eavesdropper
node E. Hence, there is no common randomness between
the legitimate communicating pairs that is not known by the
eavesdropper.
Then the signal received by the eavesdropper can be
represented as tNA ⊕ dNA + tNB ⊕ dNB + ZN2 , where ZN2 is
the Gaussian channel noise over N channel uses. Then we
have
H(tNA |tNA ⊕ dNA + tNB ⊕ dNB + ZN2 , dNA , dNB ) (6)
≥H(tNA |tNA ⊕ dNA + tNB ⊕ dNB + ZN2 , dNA , dNB , ZN2 ) (7)
=H(tNA |tNA ⊕ dNA + tNB ⊕ dNB , dNA , dNB ) (8)
=H(tNA |tNA ⊕ dNA ⊕ tNB ⊕ dNB , dNA , dNB , T ) (9)
=H(tNA |tNA ⊕ tNB , dNA , dNB , T ) (10)
=H(tNA |tNA ⊕ tNB , T ) (11)
=H
(
T |tNA ⊕ tNB , tNA
)
+H
(
tNA |tNA ⊕ tNB
)−H (T |tNA ⊕ tNB
)
(12)
≥H (tNA |tNA ⊕ tNB
)−H (T |tNA ⊕ tNB
) (13)
=H
(
tNA
)−H (T |tNA ⊕ tNB
) (14)
≥H (tNA
)−H (T ) (15)
In (9), we introduce the N bit information T that will help
to recover tNA ⊕ dNA + tNB ⊕ dNB from tNA ⊕ dNA ⊕ tNB ⊕ dNB . In
(14), we use the fact that tNA is independent from tNA ⊕ tNB
based on Corollary 1.
Let c = 1
N
I
(
tNA ; t
N
A ⊕ dNA + tNB ⊕ dNB + ZN2 , dNA , dNB
)
.
Then from (15), since H(T ) ≤ N , we have c ≤ 1.
Therefore, if the message is mapped one-to-one to tNA , then
an equivocation rate of at least C(P )−1 is achievable under
a transmission rate of C(P ) bits per channel use.
We note that to obtain perfect secrecy, some additional
effort is required. First, we define a block of channel uses
as the N channel uses required to transmit a N dimensional
lattice point. A perfect secrecy rate of C(P ) − 1 can then
be achieved by coding across multiple blocks: A codeword
in this case is composed of Q components, each component
is an N dimensional lattice point sampled from a uniform
distribution over V1 ∩ Λ in an i.i.d. fashion. The resulting
codebook C contains 2⌊NQR⌋ codewords with R < C(P ).
Like wiretap codes, the codebook is then randomly binned
into several bins, where each bin contains 2⌊NQc⌋ codewords.
The secret message W is mapped to the bins. The actual
transmitted codeword is chosen from that bin according to a
uniform distribution.
Let Y NQe denote the signals available to the eavesdropper:
Y NQe = {tNQA ⊕ dNQA + tNQB ⊕ dNQB + ZNQ, dNQA , dNQB }.
Then we have
H(W |Y NQe , C)
=H(W |tNQA , Y NQe , C) +H(tNQA |Y NQe , C)
−H(tNQA |W,Y NQe , C) (16)
≥H(tNQA |Y NQe , C)−NQε (17)
=H(tNQA |Y NQe , C)−H(tNQA |C) +H(tNQA |C)−NQε
(18)
=H(tNQA |C)− I(tNQA ;Y NQe |C)−NQε (19)
≥H
(
tNQA |C
)
−
Q∑
q=1
I
(
tNA ;Y
N
e |C
)−NQε (20)
=H
(
tNQA |C
)
−QNc−NQε = QN (R− c)−NQε
(21)
In (17), we use Fano’s inequality to bound the last term in
(16). This is because the size of each bin is kept small enough
such that given W , the eavesdropper can determine tNQA from
its received signal Y NQe . Using the standard random coding
argument and (21), it can then be shown a secrecy rate of
C(P ) − c is achievable. Since c < 1, this means a secrecy
rate of at least C(P )− 1 bits per channel use is achievable.
Remark 2: It is interesting to compare the secrecy rate
obtained here with that obtained by cooperative jamming with
Gaussian noise [20]. The latter is given by C(P )−C( P
P+1 ).
limP→∞ C(
P
P+1 ) = 0.5. Therefore there is at most 0.5 bit
per channel use of loss in secrecy rate at high SNR by using
a structured code book as the jamming signal.
B. Non-Gaussian Noise
The performance analysis in [17] requires Gaussian noise.
This is not always the case, for example, in the presence
of interference, which is not necessarily Gaussian. For non-
Gaussian noise, in principle, the analysis in [16] can be used
instead. On the other hand, in [16], a sphere is used as the
shaping set, making it difficult to computing the equivocation
rate via Theorem 1. We show below, if the code rate R has
the form log2 t, t ∈ Z+, then a scaled lattice tΛ of the fine
lattice Λ can be used for shaping instead.
Theorem 3: If Z1, Z2 are i.i.d. continuous random vari-
ables with differential entropy h(E), such that 22h(E) = 2pie,
then a secrecy rate of [log2⌊
√
P ⌋ − 1]+ is achievable.
Proof: We need to show that there exists a fine lattice
Λ that has a good decoding performance [16, Theorem 6],
and Λ is close to a sphere in the sense that
lim
N→∞
h(S) =
1
2
log2 (2pieP
′) (22)
where h(S) = 1
N
log2 |V|, |V| is the volume of the fundamen-
tal region of Λ, and P ′ = 1
N |V|
∫
x∈V
‖x‖2 dx. It is shown in
[21] that when a lattice is sampled from the lattice ensemble
defined therein, it is close to a sphere in the sense of (22).
The lattice ensemble is generally called construction A [16],
whose generation matrices are all matrix of size K×N over
finite group GF(q), with q being a prime. The lattice sampled
from the ensemble is “good” in probability when q,N →∞
and K grows faster than log2N [21, (25)-(28)]. Note that this
property of “goodness” is invariant under scaling. Therefore,
we can scale the lattice so that the volume of its fundamental
region remains fixed when its dimension N →∞. This gives
us a sequence of lattice ensembles that meet the condition
of [13, Lemma 1]: (1) N →∞ (2) q →∞. (3) Each lattice
ensemble of a given dimension is balanced [16]. This means
when N →∞, at least 3/4 of the lattice ensemble is good for
channel coding [13, Lemma 1]. The lattice decoder will have
a positive decoding error exponent as long as |V| > 2Nh(E).
Combined, this means there must exist a lattice Λ∗ that
is close to a sphere and is a good channel code at the
same time. Hence we have 1
N
log2 |V| → 12 log2 (2pieP ′) as
N →∞. Since we assume h(E) = 12 log2(2pie) and require
|V| > 2Nh(E), this means as long as P ′ > 1, the decoding
error will decrease exponentially when N →∞.
Now pick the shaping set to be the fundamental region
of tΛ∗, t ∈ Z+. Then the code rate R = log2(t) [17]. With
the dithering and modulus operation from [17], the average
power of the transmitted signal per dimension is t2P ′. Note
that the modulus operation at the destination, required in
order to remove the dithering noise, may distort the additive
channel noise. However, the decoding error event, defined as
the noise pushing a lattice codeword into the set of typical
noise sequence centered on a different lattice point [16],
remains identical. Therefore, the decoding error exponent
is the same. Hence we have P ′ > 1 and t2P ′ < P . The
largest possible t is ⌊√P ⌋, with the rate being log2(⌊
√
P ⌋).
With similar arguments as in Theorem 2, we conclude that a
secrecy rate of [log2(⌊
√
P ⌋)− 1]+ is achievable.
IV. MULTI-HOP LINE NETWORK WITH UNTRUSTED
RELAYS
A. System Model
In this section, we examine a more complicated communi-
cation scenario, as shown in Figure 2. The source has to com-
municate over K − 1 hops (K ≥ 3) to reach the destination.
Yet the intermediate relaying nodes are untrusted and need to
be prevented from decoding the source information. Under
this model, we will show that, using Theorem 1, with lattice
codes for source transmission and jamming signals and an
appropriate transmission schedule, an end-to-end secrecy rate
that is independent of the number of untrusted relay nodes
is achievable. We assume nodes can not receive and transmit
signals simultaneously. We assume that each node can only
communicate to its two neighbors, one on each side. Let Yi
and Xi be the received and transmitted signal of the ith node
respectively. Then they are related as Yi = Xi−1+Xi+1+Zi,
where Zi are zero mean Gaussian random variables with unit
variance, and are independent from each other. Each node has
S 1 2 3 D
Fig. 2. A Line Network with 3 Un-trusted Relays
the same average power constraint: 1
n
∑n
k=1E
[
Xi(k)
2
] ≤ P¯
where n is the total number of channel uses. The channel
gains are normalized for simplicity.
We consider the case where there is an eavesdropper
residing at each relay node and these eavesdroppers are not
cooperating. This also addresses the scenario where there is
one eavesdropper, but the eavesdropper may appear at any
one relay node that is unknown a priori. In either case, we
need secrecy from all relays and the secrecy constraints for
the K relay nodes are expressed as lim
n→∞
1
n
H (W |Y ni ) =
lim
n→∞
1
n
H (W ) , i = 1...K .
B. Signaling Scheme
Because all nodes are half duplex, a schedule is necessary
to control when a node should talk. The node schedule is
best represented by the acyclic directional graph as shown
in Figure 3. The columns in Figure 3 indicate the nodes and
the rows in Figure 3 indicate the phases. The length of a
phase is the number of channel uses required to transmit a
lattice point, which equals the dimension of the lattice. A
node in a row has an outgoing edge if it transmits during
a phase. The node in that row has an incoming edge if it
can hear signals during the previous phase. It is understood,
though not shown in the figure, that the signal received by
the node is a superposition of the signals over all incoming
edges corrupted by the additive Gaussian noise.
A number of consecutive phases is called one block, as
shown in Figure 3. The boundary of a block is shown by the
dotted line in Figure 3. The data transmission is carried over
M blocks.
O
ne
 b
lo
ck
 o
f c
ha
nn
el
 u
se
s
t0 + t1 + J4
J
−1
J0
J1
J2
J0
J1
J2
J3
t0 + J0
t0 + J1
t0 + J2
t0 + J3
t0 + J1
t0 + J2
t0 + J3
t0 + J4
t0 + t1 + J1
t0 + t1 + J2
t0 + t1 + J3
Fig. 3. One Block of Channel Uses
Again the nested lattice code (Λ,Λ1) from [10] is used
within each block. The codebook is constructed in the same
fashion as in Section III.
1) The Source Node: The input to the channel by the
source has the form tN ⊕JN ⊕dN . Here dN is the dithering
noise which is uniformly distributed over V1. tN and JN are
determined as follows: If it is the first time the source node
transmits during this block, tN is the origin. JN is picked
from the lattice points in Λ∩V1 under a uniform distribution.
Otherwise, tN is picked by the encoder. JN is the lattice
point decoded from the jamming signal the source received
during the previous phase. This design is not essential but it
brings some uniformness in the form of received signals and
simplifies explanation.
2) The Relay Node: As this signal propagates toward the
destination, each relay node, when it is its turn, sends a
jamming signal in the form of tNk +dNk mod Λ, k = 2...K−1,
where K is the number of nodes. Subscript k denotes the
node index which transmit this signal. If this is the first
time the relay transmits during this block, then tNk is drawn
from a uniform distribution over Λ ∩ V1, and all previous
received signals are ignored. Otherwise, tNk is computed from
the signal it received during the previous phase. This will
be clarified in the sequel. dNk again is the dithering noise
uniformly distributed over V1.
The signal received by the relay within a block can be
categorized into the following three cases. Let zN denote the
Gaussian channel noise.
1) If this is the first time the relay receives signals during
this block, then it has the form (tNA ⊕dNA )+zN . It only
contains interference from its left neighbor.
2) If this is the last time the relay receives signals during
this block, then it has the form (tNB ⊕dNB )+zN . It only
contains interference from its right neighbor.
3) Otherwise it has the form yNk = (tNA ⊕ dNA ) + (tNB ⊕
dNB ) + z
N
.
Here tNA , tNB are lattice points, and dNA , dNB are dithering
noises. Following reference [10], if the lattice is properly
designed and the cardinality of the set Λ ∩ V1 is properly
chosen, then for case (3), the relay, with the knowledge of
dNA , d
N
B , will be able to decode tNA ⊕ tNB . For case (1) and
(2), the relay will be able to decode tNA and tNB respectively.
Otherwise, we say that a decoding error has occurred at the
relay node.
The transmitted signal at the relay node is then computed
as follows:
xN = tNA ⊕ tNB ⊕ (−x′N )⊕ dNC (23)
Here x′N is the lattice point contained in the jamming signal
transmitted by this relay node during the previous phase. − is
the inverse operation defined over the group V1∩Λ. tNA ⊕ tNB
are decoded from the signal it received during the previous
phase.
In Figure 3, we labeled the lattice points transmitted over
some edges. For clarity we omitted the superscript N . The
+ signs in the figure are all modulus operations. The reason
why we have (−x′N ) in (23) is now apparent: it leads to
a simple expression for the signal as it propagates from the
relay to the destination.
3) The Destination: As shown in Figure 3, the destination
behaves identically to a relay node when it computes its
jamming signal.
It is also clear from Figure 3 that the destination will be
able to decode the data from the source. This is because
the lattice point contained in the signal received by the
destination has the form tN ⊕ JN , where tN is the lattice
point determined by the transmitted data, and JN is the lattice
point in the jamming signal known by the destination.
C. A Lower Bound to the Secrecy Rate
Suppose the source transmits Q+ 1 times within a block.
Then each relay node receives Q+2 batches of signals within
the block. An example with Q = 2 is shown in Figure 3.
Given the inputs from the source of the current block, the
signals received by the relay node are independent from
the signals it received during any other block. Therefore,
if a block of channel uses is viewed as one meta-channel
use, with the source input as the channel input and the
signal received by the relay as the channel output, then the
effective channel is memoryless. Each relay node has the
The relay node
under consideration
tND3
xNA1
xNA2
tNB1
tNB2
tNB2
tND1
tNA1
xNA1
xNA2
tNB1
tND2
tNA2
tNB3
xNA3
tNA3
xNA3
tNB3
Fig. 4. Notations for Lattice Points contained in Signals, Q = 2
following side information regarding the source inputs within
one block:
1) Q+ 2 batches of received signals.
2) All the dithering noises {di}.
3) Signals transmitted from the relay node during this
block. Note that only the first batch of signals it trans-
mitted may provide information because all subsequent
transmitted signals are computed from received signals
and dithering noises.
Let W be the secret message transmitted over M blocks.
Following the notation in Figure 4, the equivocation with
respect to the relay node is given by:
H2 =
1
NM
H(W |(xNMA1 ⊕ dNMα1 ) + zNM1 , dNMα1
(xNMAi ⊕ dNMαi ) + (tNMD(i−1) ⊕ dNMβ(i−1)) + zNMi ,
dNMαi , d
NM
β(i−1), i = 2...Q+ 1
(tNMD(Q+1) ⊕ dNMβ(Q+1)) + zNMQ+1, dNMβ(Q+1), tNMB1 , dNMb1 ) (24)
Define the block error probability as
P¯e = Pr(∃i ∈ {2...Q+ 1}, s.t.xNAi is in error,
or tND(i−1) is in error, or t
N
D(Q+1) is in error.) (25)
where xNAi is the part of xNMAi that is within one block.
Similar notations are used for tN
D(i−1) and tND(Q+1). Given
the signaling scheme presented in section IV-B and [17,
Theorem 2], the probability of decoding error at each relay
node goes to zero as N →∞. Let Pe(i, k) be the probability
of decoding error at relay node i during phase k. Then P¯e
is related to Pe(i, k) as P¯e ≤ 1−
∏
i,k(1− Pe(i, k)), where
the subscript in product includes the indices of all the relay
node and the indices of the phases in this block.
For any given block length Q, we have limN→∞ P¯e = 0.
Note that P¯e is just a function of N and Q. Because there
are only finite number of relay nodes, this convergence is
uniform over all relay nodes.
Let the equivocation under error free decoding be
H¯2 =
1
NM
H(W |(xNMA1 ⊕ dNMα1 ) + zNM1 , dNMα1
(x¯NMAi ⊕ dNMαi ) + (t¯NMD(i−1) ⊕ dNMβ(i−1)) + zNMi ,
dNMαi , d
NM
β(i−1), i = 2...Q+ 1
(t¯NMD(Q+1) ⊕ dNMβ(Q+1)) + zNMQ+1, dNMβ(Q+1), tNMB1 , dNMb1 ) (26)
where x¯NMAi equals the value xNMAi takes with error free
decoding. t¯NM
D(i−1) and t¯NMD(Q+1) are defined in a similar
fashion. Then we have the following lemma:
Lemma 2: For a given Q, H¯2+ε2 ≥ H2 ≥ H¯2−ε1 where
ε1,2 → 0 as N,M →∞.
Proof: Let cj , cˆj denote the part of signals received by
the relay node within the jth block. More specifically, they
have the following form:
cˆj = {(xNAi(j)⊕ dNαi(j))+
(tND(i−1)(j)⊕ dNβ(i−1)(j)) + zNi (j), i = 2...Q+ 1} (27)
cj = {(x¯NAi(j)⊕ dNαi(j))+
(t¯ND(i−1)(j)⊕ dNβ(i−1)(j)) + zNi (j), i = 2...Q+ 1} (28)
In this notation, we exclude the first and the last batch of
received signals. The first batch of received signals does
not undergo any decoding operation. For the last batch of
received signals we have the following notation:
fˆ j = (tND(Q+1)(j)⊕ dNβ(Q+1)(j)) + zNQ+1(j) (29)
f j = (t¯ND(Q+1)(j)⊕ dNβ(Q+1)(j)) + zNQ+1(j) (30)
The block index (j) will be omitted in the following discus-
sion for clarity.
We first prove that cj − cˆj is a discrete random variable
with a finite support. According to the notation of (28), cj−cˆj
has Q components. Each component can be expressed as
(
x¯NAi ⊕ dNαi
)− (xNAi ⊕ dNαi
)
+
(t¯ND(i−1) ⊕ dNβ(i−1))− (tND(i−1) ⊕ dNβ(i−1)) (31)
For the first line of (31) we have
(
x¯NAi ⊕ dNαi
)− (xNAi ⊕ dNαi
) (32)
=x¯NAi + d
N
αi + x
N
1 −
(
xNAi + d
N
αi + x
N
2
) (33)
=x¯NAi − xNAi + xN1 − xN2 (34)
where xN1 , xN2 belong to the coarse lattice Λ1. Applying
Theorem 1, we note that xN1 and xN2 each has at most 2N
possible solutions. x¯NAi and xNAi each take ‖V1 ∩Λ‖ possible
values. Let R = 1
N
log2 ‖V1 ∩ Λ‖. Then (32) takes at most
22N(R+1) possible values. Similarly, we can prove that the
second line of (31) has at most 22N(R+1) possible values as
well. Therefore cj − cˆj takes at most 24NQ(R+1) possible
values. Therefore H
(
cj − cˆj) ≤ 4NQ(R + 1). Similarly, it
can be shown that f − fˆ has at most 2N(R + 1) solutions.
This means that
H(cj − cˆj , f j − fˆ j) ≤ (4Q+ 2)N(R+ 1) (35)
Let c = {cj}, cˆ = {cˆj}, f = {f j} and fˆ = {fˆ j} j = 1...M .
Let b denote the remaining conditioning terms in H2. Let Ej
denote the random variable cj 6= cˆj or f j 6= fˆ j . Then with
probability P¯e that Ej = 1. Otherwise Ej = 0. Let W be
the message transmitted over the M blocks. Then we have
H(W |b, cˆ, fˆ)
≥H(W |b, c, cˆ, f, fˆ) (36)
=H(W |b, c, f, c− cˆ, f − fˆ) (37)
=H(W |b, c, f) +H(c− cˆ, f − fˆ |W, b, c, f)
−H(c− cˆ, f − fˆ |b, c, f) (38)
≥H(W |b, c, f)−H(c− cˆ, f − fˆ) (39)
≥H(W |b, c, f)−
M∑
j=1
H(cj − cˆj , f j − fˆ j) (40)
=H(W |b, c, f)−
M∑
j=1
H(cj − cˆj , f j − fˆ j , Ej) (41)
≥H(W |b, c, f)−
M∑
j=1
H(Ej)
−
M∑
j=1
Pr(Ej = 1)H(cj − cˆj , f j − fˆ j) (42)
≥H(W |b, c, f)−M −MP¯e(4Q+ 2)N(R+ 1) (43)
By dividing NM on both sides and letting N,M →∞, and
ε1 = 1/N + P¯e(4Q + 2)(R+ 1) we get H2 ≥ H¯2 − ε1.
Similarly we can prove H¯2 ≥ H2 − ε2.
Remark 3: Lemma 2 says that if a particular equivocation
value is achievable with regard to one relay node, when all
the other relay nodes do error free decoding, then the same
equivocation value is achievable when other relay nodes do
decode and forward which is only error free in asymptotic
sense.
Lemma 3: H¯2 is the same for all relay nodes.
Proof: Lemma follows because relay nodes receive
statistically equivalent signals if there are no decoding errors.
For the kth relay node, as shown by the edge labels in
Figure 3, the condition term of H¯2 in (26) is related to tNMj
as follows:
xNMA1 = J
NM
k−2 (44)
x¯NMA2 = t
NM
0 ⊕ JNMk−1 (45)
x¯NMA3 = t
NM
0 ⊕ tNM1 ⊕ JNMk (46)
...
x¯NMA(Q+1) = t
NM
0 ⊕ tNM1 ⊕ ...⊕ tNMQ−1 ⊕ JNMK+Q−2 (47)
t¯NMD1 = J
NM
k (48)
t¯NMD2 = t
NM
0 ⊕ JNMk+1 (49)
t¯NMD3 = t
NM
0 ⊕ tNM1 ⊕ JNMk+2 (50)
...
t¯NMD(Q+1) = t
NM
0 ⊕ tNM1 ⊕ ...tNMQ−1 ⊕ JNMk+Q (51)
tNMB1 = J
NM
k−1 (52)
Given the lattice points transmitted by the source tNMj , the
joint distribution of the side information for any relay node
is the same. Hence we have the lemma.
With these preparation, we are now ready to present the
following achievable rate.
Theorem 4: For any ε > 0, a secrecy rate of at least
0.5(C(2P¯ − 0.5)− 1)− ε bits per channel use is achievable
regardless of the number of hops.
Proof: According to Lemma 3, it suffices to design
the coding scheme based on one relay node. We focus on
one block of channel uses as shown in Figure 3. Let V (j)
to denote all the side information available to the relay
node within the jth block. We start by lower bounding
H(tNQ0 |V (j)) under ideal error free decoding, where tNQ0
are the lattice points picked by the encoder at the source node
as described in Section IV-B within this block. H(tNQ0 |V (j))
equals
H(tNQ0 |(x¯NAi ⊕ dNαi) + (t¯ND(i−1) ⊕ dNβ(i−1)) + zNi ,
dNαi, d
N
β(i−1), i = 2...Q+ 1, t
N
B1, d
N
b1) (53)
Comparing (53) with the condition terms in (26), we see
that we have removed the first batch and the last batch of
received signals during a block from the condition terms
because they are independent from everything else. The last
batch of received signals contains the lattice point of the
most recent jamming signal observable by the relay node. Its
independence follows from Lemma 1.
We then assume that the eavesdropper residing at the relay
node knows the channel noise. This means (53) can be lower
bounded by:
H(tNQ0 |(x¯NAi ⊕ dNαi) + (t¯ND(i−1) ⊕ dNβ(i−1)),
dNαi, d
N
β(i−1), i = 2...Q+ 1, t
N
B1, d
N
b1) (54)
Next, we invoke Theorem 1. Equation (54) can be lower
bounded by:
H(tNQ0 |x¯NAi ⊕ dNαi ⊕ t¯ND(i−1) ⊕ dNβ(i−1), Ti,
dNαi, d
N
β(i−1), i = 2...Q+ 1, t
N
B1, d
N
b1) (55)
where Ti can be represented with N bits. Using the similar
argument as in (9)-(13), (55) is lower bounded by:
H(tNQ0 |x¯NAi ⊕ dNαi ⊕ t¯ND(i−1) ⊕ dNβ(i−1),
dNαi, d
N
β(i−1),i=2...Q+1 , t
N
B1, d
N
b1)−H(Ti,i=2...Q+1 ) (56)
=H(tNQ0 |x¯NAi ⊕ t¯ND(i−1),i=2...Q+1 , tNB1)−H(Ti,i=2...Q+1 )
(57)
It turns out that in the first term in (57), the conditional
variables are all independent from tNQ0 . This is because
t¯N
D(i−1) contains J
N
i−2+k, which is a new lattice point not
contained in previous t¯ND(j−1) or x¯NAj j < i. The new lattice
point is uniformly distributed over V1 ∩ Λ. Therefore, from
Lemma 1, x¯NAi⊕ t¯ND(i−1) is independent from tNQ0 . Therefore
(57) equals
H(tNQ0 )−H(Ti,i=2...Q+1 ) (58)
Define
c =
1
NQ
I(tNQ0 ;V (j)) (59)
Then from (58), we have c ∈ (0, 1).
To achieve perfect secrecy, a similar argument of coding
across different blocks as the one in Section III can be used.
A codebook with rate R and size 2⌊MNQR⌋ that spans over
M blocks is constructed as follows: Each codeword is a
length MQ sequence. Each component of the sequence is
an N -dimensional lattice point sampled in an i.i.d fashion
from the uniform distribution over V1 ∩ Λ. The codebook is
then randomly binned into several bins. Each bin contains
2⌊MNQc⌋ codewords, with c given by (59). Denote the
codebook with C.
The transmitted codeword is determined as follows: Con-
sider a message set {W}, whose size equals the number of
the bins. The message is mapped to the bins in a one-to-one
fashion. The actual transmitted codeword is then selected
from the bin according to a uniform distribution. Let this
codeword be uMNQ. Let V = {V (j), j = 1...M}. Then we
have:
H (W |V, C) (60)
=H
(
W |uMNQ, V, C)+H (uMNQ|V, C)
−H (uMNQ|W,V, C) (61)
≥H (uMNQ|V, C)−MNQε (62)
=H
(
uMNQ|C)− I (uMNQ;V |C)−MNQε (63)
≥H (uMNQ|C)−
M∑
j=1
I
(
uMNQ(j);V (j)
)−MNQε (64)
=H
(
uMNQ|C)−MNQc−MNQε (65)
(62) follows from Fano’s inequality and the size of the bin
is picked according to the rate of information leaked to
the eavesdropper under the same input distribution used to
sample the codebook. (64) follows from C → uMNQ → V
being a Markov chain. Divide (60) and (65) by MNQ and let
M →∞, we have ε→ 0 and limM→∞ 1MNQH(W |V, C) =
limM→∞
1
MNQ
H(W ). Therefore a secrecy rate of R − c
bits per channel use is achieved. According to [10], R can
be arbitrarily close to C(P−0.5) by making N →∞, where
P is the average power per channel use spent to transmit a
lattice point. For a given node, during 2Q + 3 phases, it is
active in Q + 1 phases. Since c ∈ [0, 1], a secrecy rate of
Q+1
2Q+3 (C(
2Q+3
Q+1 P¯ − 0.5) − 1) is then achievable by letting
M →∞. Taking the limit Q→∞, we have the theorem.
V. CONCLUSION
Lattice codes were shown recently as a useful technique to
prove information theoretic results. In this work, we showed
that lattice codes are also useful to prove secrecy results.
This was done by showing that the equivocation rate could
be bounded if the shaping set and the “fine” lattice forms
a nested lattice structure. With this new tool, we computed
the secrecy rate for two models: (1) a wiretap channel with
a cooperative jammer, (2) a multi-hop line network with
untrusted relays. For the second model, we have shown that
a coding scheme can be designed to support a non-vanishing
secrecy rate regardless of the number of hops.
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